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Loopholes in the law are weaknesses that allow the law to be circumvented
Once created, they prove hard to eliminate. A case study of the evolving tax unit
used in the federal income tax explores policymakers' response to loopholes. The
1913 income tax created an opportunity for wealthy married couples to shift
ownership of family income between spouses, then to file separately, and, as a
result, to reduce their collective taxes. In 1948, Congress closed this loophole by
extending the income-splitting benefit to all married taxpayers filing jointly.
Congress acted only after the federal judiciary and Treasury Department pleaded
for congressional reform and, receiving none, reduced their roles policing wealthy
couples' tax abuse. The other branches would no longer accept the delegated
power to regulate the tax unit. By examining these developments, this article
explores the impact of the separation of powers on the closing of loopholes and
adds to our understanding of how the government operates. It concludes that when
statutes contain loopholes that are not politically salient, there is a limit as to how
long policymakers will accept a delegation of responsibility to police the loopholes.
I. INTRODUCTION
"The great problem to be solved" by the Founding Fathers was to design
governance institutions that would afford "practical security" against the excessive
concentration of political power. Their product, our Constitution, envisions a
system in which each branch of the federal government has its own duties and
powers and the states retain much of the obligations and powers of governing. 2 The
Constitution does not specify how the division of power is to be enforced; and
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founders, such as James Madison, understood that this separation of government
functions would not be strictly maintained and that the resulting checks and
balances would often achieve beneficial ends. 3 This system was to preserve the
American public's liberty, even at the price of raising the cost of governance. 4 For
Madison, and for many scholars today, the goal was to design institutions so that
policymakers' self-serving desires could be channeled to public ends.5
A question of governance that has yet to be answered is how to prevent the
creation of loopholes in statutory regimes and, secondarily, how to structure the
government to encourage closing loopholes once they have been created. Judge
Frank Easterbrook described legislation as compromises, "and the cornerstone of
many a compromise is the decision, usually unexpressed, to leave certain issues
unresolved."6 Once a compromise is exploited as a loophole, the public might
rationally demand that their political leaders change the law. However, as discussed
below, the separation of powers can provide political insulation that discourages the
different branches of government from taking action to close them. Little scholarly
attention has been given to these instances when no one wants political power
because the potential blame for closing someone's loophole outweighs the political
benefits that might be derived from improving the law. 7
Public choice models predict that when the cost of legislation is concentrated
but its benefits are dispersed the minority will be able to thwart congressional
action. It requires a political entrepreneur to impose the majority's will on the
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). Compare the language of U.S. CONST. art. 11, §l ("The
executive Power shall be vested in a President. . .") and art. 111, § I ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court. . .") with art. 1, §8 ("The Congress shall have the Power. . .To make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper. . .").
4. Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (2003); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the
Separation ofPowers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 732-8 (1993); Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in
Government: Separation ofPowers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 577-78 (1984).
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). See, e.g., DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (Ira Katznelson, Matin Shefier & Theda Skopol eds., 2001); JACOB S. HACKER,
THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002); Daniel R. Ernst, Law and American Political
Development, 1877-1938, 26 REV. AM. HIST. 205 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and
Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Governance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act,
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951 (2005); Terry M. Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J. L.,
EcON. & ORG. 1 (2005); Reuel Schiller, "Saint George and the Dragon ": Courts and the Development of the
Administrative State in Twentieth-Century America, 17 J. POL'Y HIST. I 10 (2005); Mathew C. Stephenson,
Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (2006). But see Daniel A, Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992); Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at The Theoretical
and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 217-23 (1988); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinsky & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 549 (2002).
6. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes 'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540 (1983).
7. Congressional delegation is predicted when pleasing some constituents harms others. See MICHAEL
HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS 198 (1981); NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 5 (Univ.
of Chi. Press 1994); Maxwell L. Steams, The Public Choice Case Against the Line Item Veto, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 385, 405-6 (1992). More has been written on the creation of loopholes in the tax code than on
their closure. For an interesting study, see JOHN WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 269-335 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1985).
8. HAYES, supra note 7, at 99-126; JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 332-37 (Princeton
I432012]
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minority.9 One difficulty in closing loopholes is that the benefit of the loophole is
concentrated while the benefit of an equitable regime is diffuse. Those benefiting
from the loophole not only face the psychological cost of losing a benefit, often a
stronger motivator than the hope of a just system, but also have fewer transaction
costs when uniting to block corrective legislation.10 As a result, in most cases one
would expect loopholes to persist; the question is through what means is the
loophole protected.
This case study examines whether those predictions are accurate in a deep
history of one important issue for the U.S. federal income tax. In what was seen as a
loophole of the early tax, political entrepreneurs did not step forward even though
those burdened were few, dispersed, and not well-organized on the issue. The
particular issue being examined - the tax unit which dictates who is required to file
a single tax return - was recognized to provide opportunities for abuse.I'
Nonetheless, as shown in the congressional record and legislative debates,
legislators received little sustained pressure from their constituents regarding how
the tax unit should be defined.12 In the face of relative public apathy, what
motivated and constrained policymakers' decisions remains unexplored. As with
many issues in the day-to-day operation of government, that the issue had little
political salience except among those directly affected, and even then relatively
little, meant that policymakers could act without fear of direct political reprisal.' 3
Although this new theory has yet to be broadly tested, this study shows that
when a policy change is recognized to create identifiable winners and losers,
elected officials will not act aggressively even to privilege their constituents. 14
Instead, they act reluctantly and only when forced. On the other hand, for a period
the Treasury Department and the courts interpreted the law in ways that they
believed would accomplish the greater good. For a time the system operated in a
way that would have made Madison proud. Moreover, when these branches stopped
policing the exploitation of the loophole, they did so not because they were not
captured by those who stood to gain but in order to abdicate the power to the
Univ. Press 1973).
9. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 34-36, 175-78 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971).
10. See Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron, Framing and Taxation: Evaluation of Tax Policies
Involving Household Composition, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 679 (2004). Moreover, those seeking to maintain a
loophole merely need to thwart legislation whereas those seeking to close it need legislative action. Id.
11. While scholars today might not view this as avoidance, it was seen as avoidance at the time. See, e.g.,
Randolph E. Paul and Valentine B. Havens, Husband and Wife Under the Income Tax, 5 BROOK. L. REV. 241,
255 (1936); Robert M. Yoder, She's Dear, But Is She Deductible?, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Oct. 12, 1946,
at 17; For similar results in environmental law, see also John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).
12. Legislators did receive pressure in 1941 and 1942, infra notes 94 and 97.
13. Regarding the salience of taxes, see Marcus Berliant & Hideo Konishi, Salience: Agenda Choices by
Competing Candidates, 125 PUBLIC CHOICE 129 (2005); Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1165 (2009); Amy Finkelstein, E-Z Tax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates,
124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J.
REG. 1 (2011).
14. This is unlike the distribution of tax benefits that benefits a few and has no identifiable losers. See
Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84




After the executive agency and the judiciary stopped policing behavior,
Congress was a reluctant entrepreneur and adopted the income-splitting joint return
in 1948 to replace the original individual-based tax system.15 It did so trying to
reconcile competing objectives. The income tax system has historically had several
objectives when choosing who should file a single tax return: individuals, married
couples, or families. In their choice of tax unit, the government sought to treat all
taxpayers in the same economic position the same way regardless of their marital
status as well as to tax everyone according to their ability to pay.16 Boris Bittker
once proved it is impossible to attain each of these goals at the same time. 17 As
long as a progressive rate structure is maintained, a system that is neutral to
marriage will tax couples with the same amount of income different amounts.
For an example that highlights the zero sum nature of this political choice,
assume that there are five taxpayers: Anne, Ben, Carrie, Dan, and Ed. Anne and
Ben are married as are Carrie and Dan. Ed is single. Anne and Ben each earn
$10,000 this year, Carrie earns $0, and Dan and Ed each earn $20,000. Each
"household" has the same income, but Anne-Ben is an equal-earning couple while
Carrie-Dan has one income earner. The tax system is progressive: the rate is 10%
on all income above $10,000 but income $10,000 and below is exempt from tax.
Under an individually assessed system, Anne, Ben, and Carrie would pay $0 while
Dan and Ed would pay $1,000 each. Anne-Ben pays less as a couple than Carrie-







Under the joint taxation system adopted by Congress in 1948, married couples
are taxed as a unit but with tax brackets twice as wide as those for single taxpayers,
therefore married couples' income up to $20,000 is exempt from tax.18 As a result,
neither couple owes federal income tax; Ed, on the other hand, is taxed $1,000.
15. See infra pp. 174-75.
16. Boris 1. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1396-97 (1975).
17. Id.
18. Technically, a couple filing jointly in 1948 would owe federal income tax equal to twice the amount
that would have been due on half its income. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, §§ 301-303, 62 Stat.
110, 114-16 (1948). The method of calculating joint tax obligations has since been changed to a separate







In order to raise the same amount of government revenue as under the
individual regime, the government might double the tax rate to 20%, in which case
Ed would bear the entire increased tax burden. Thus, under a progressive system,
the choice of tax unit matters as to the allocation of tax liabilities and, after they
perform this calculation, the different constituencies can see who is winning and
who is losing by either choice of tax unit.
The issue was made more difficult for Congress because, from the income tax's
enactment in 1913, policymakers recognized that with the original individual-filing
system wealthy spouses could shift income to their lower-income mates and
minimize their collective taxes. 19 In other words, Dan could (and often did) shift
$10,000 of income to Carrie, Carrie would then be taxed on the $10,000, and
together they would owe less in tax ($0 as opposed to $1,000).20 But this tax
reduction only worked for wealthy taxpayers who were married and had income
that the Supreme Court would allow to be shifted. Some taxpayers, but not all,
could reduce their collective taxes through tax planning. This threat to the integrity
of the progressive tax system proved more dangerous when rates were made very
progressive and top marginal tax rates reached 77 percent in World War I.21
The zero-sum nature of the tax unit was especially apparent in the era before
deficit financing. The choice to spend on one government project necessarily means
there is less money available for another, but the way the public and policymakers
interpret these issues differ.22 Although in a given year one group might receive a
tax reduction without increasing the tax rates applied to other groups, those not
benefiting suffer under relatively more in taxes and, over time, as revenue needs
increase and with it tax rates, the zero-sum nature becomes more direct. Regardless
of whether choices with respect to the tax unit were zero sum in a given year, the
policy developed as a result of the abdication of responsibility because
policymakers understood the issue as zero sum. Left unanswered in this article is
the interesting question of how issues are framed and why some are recognized as
19. Couples could file joint returns before 1948 but the Treasury Department did not always calculate
their liability as a unit. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Before 1948, there might be economic
benefits to filing jointly if one spouse had losses or deductions to offset the other's income. Id.
20. Dan's ability to shift income would depend on the source of his income. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1930).
21. Data Release, Personal Exemptions and Individual Income Tax Rates, 1913-2002,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02inpetr.pdf.
22. DANIEL SHAVIRO, Do DEFICITS MATTER? 308-09 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1997); Gary S. Becker, A
Theory ofCompetition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. EcoN. 371, 376 (1983).
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zero sum and others are not. 23
Because of the difficulty policymakers had framing a solution to income-
shifting tax avoidance, the issue of the appropriate tax unit presents an opportunity
to question the wisdom of Madison's grand design. This article argues that
Congress reversed course in 1948 only in reaction to the recognition that it could no
longer delegate responsibility.24 That realization was coupled with an opportunistic
ability to frame the change as a tax reduction and not as the imposition of a tax
increase. In this instance of a zero sum game, favorable laws that would benefit the
public by clarifying the law and preventing its avoidance were slow to pass.25 No
branch was required to act. Not deciding the law led to a stalemate that benefited
some taxpayers over others. 26
Recent scholarship, particularly by those authors studying positive political
theory, examines the interrelationship of institutional players, such as legislators,
agency personnel, and the courts, as creators of policy.27 Policymaking is depicted
as dynamic; those making policy respond to each other sequentially in real time. In
this case study, after a period during which an executive agency and the judiciary
worked to solve problems created by an omission in the original tax statute, those
political actors stopped taking responsibility for policing the loophole. When
Congress refused to act, eventually the other branches tossed the hot potato, and the
minority group of taxpayers won.
Based on this study, it is incorrect for scholars to assume that the various
branches of government will always accept a delegation of power from Congress.28
Consistent with classic game theory, the branches understood that the outcome of
this policy depended on the actions of others.29 Knowing that each branch must
23. When closing loopholes in the law, those who previously benefited will always experience a loss.
The question remains why others sometimes feel they directly benefit. This is a more direct sense than the
nebulous joy of "soaking the rich." Because of space constraints, I minimize discussion of interest groups in
this article. Few members of the public showed interest in this element of tax policy with the notable
exception of 1941 and 1942. For a full discussion of interest groups, see Stephanie Hunter McMahon, Money,
Sex, and Tax Policy: Developments in Tax Avoidance and Marital Returns, 1913-1948 (January 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virgina) (on file with UMI Microform, ProQuest LLC).
24. This is not the only time Congress has avoided power. Scholars have critiqued congressional inaction
in the war on terror and more generally in foreign affairs. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation ofParties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2352 (2006). Not everyone thinks it is worth the
resources to close loopholes. See Mark J. Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection
Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 85 VA. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (1989).
25. Change must overcome procedural hurdles. ELIZABETH GERBER, POPULIST PARADOX 7-8, 37-58
(Princeton Univ. Press 1999).
26. Of course, the alternative situation in which Congress did act might have produced a less equitable
result.
27. See supra note 5; Davis S. Law, Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2006); Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the
US. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (2007); Daniel
B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1474-87 (2003).
28. See Marilyn F. Drees, Do State Legislatures in Resolving the "Just Compensation" Dilemma? Some
Lessons from Public Choice and Positive Political Theory, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 787, 809 (1997).
29. Stephen W. Salant & Theodore S. Sims, Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime Time?, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1839, 1846-47 (1996).
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compromise in order to forge a political deal, this allowed them to abdicate
responsibility for making policy. This history demonstrates that policymakers are
not always seeking to create a deal in the first place. By not compromising, each
branch hoped to remain clear of blame for the loophole. Understanding this helps
better predict policymakers' action (or inaction) in the face of statutory weaknesses.
Moreover, understanding this history should influence how we interpret statutes
and the value we give to legislative intent. Scholars theorize that the choice of a
judge's interpretative tool favors a particular allocation of power between the
branches of government, and it is this allocation that we must evaluate for its ability
to achieve justice.30 However, in situations where no branch is taking the lead on a
policy issue, this theory of statutory interpretation merely exacerbates existing
political dynamics of what is, in effect, a political vacuum. Accepting Congress's
signaling function is difficult if not impossible when, as in the case of the tax unit
between 1913 and 1948, Congress abdicates that function.31
This article thus provides a description of intergovernmental relations in which
the fragmentation of power prevented the concentration of policy development in
one center and allowed a loophole to flourish. Part II examines the Treasury
Department's efforts to respond to taxpayer abuse, first by attempting to define
rules and then by lobbying for legislative change. Part III assesses the Supreme
Court's attempt to persuade congressional action in several of its opinions. Part IV
evaluates Congress's actions and final resolution. Finally, the article concludes that
the delay in action exemplifies a dangerous policy model of inaction.
1I. THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE: PRESSED INTO INACTION
Scholars fear that an executive agency will be captured by the interests that it
regulates even as it "seize[s] opportunities to expand its jurisdiction and its
lawmaking authority."32 These twin concerns leave scholars struggling to devise
30. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995); Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1910 (2004).
31. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027
(2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); Earl M.
Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified Internationalist Approach, 63
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1988); John F. Manning, Putting Legislative History to a Vote: A Response to Professor
Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529 (2000); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory
in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP PROBs. 3 (1994); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionary Statutory Interpretation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007);
Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory
Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427 (2005); Peter L. Strauss, Statutes Are Not Static: The Case of the APA, 14 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 767, 770 (2005); But see William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in
Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (2000); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not an
It: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
32. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 62 (1982). See
also Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Power and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over
Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 675-92 (1992); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective
Choice: Arrow 's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies,
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means to control agencies and ensure that they follow Congress's dictates. 33 This
case study shows that these fears are not always realized. Although the nature of the
tax unit question forced the Treasury Department to draft rules in order for the tax
to operate, this executive agency acted with little desire for the responsibility as its
rulings attempted to narrow the loophole permitting income shifting. At a time
when few Americans paid the income tax, the Treasury Department initially
pursued a policy that put the concerns of the larger number of citizens over a small
group of wealthy couples.
One scholar suggests that "a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation"
reduces rather than exacerbates counter-majoritarian problems in agency
rulemaking. 34 In this case, the executive agency pulled policy from the extremes of
unfettered taxpayer discretion to family taxation as it struggled to develop a fair tax.
However, the Department also lobbied Congress for more explicit laws that would
relieve the agency of the burden of policing individuals' activities. 35 When
Congress failed to respond, the Treasury Department stepped down from its
decision-making position, leaving the power with the interest group of wealthy,
married taxpayers. Interested taxpayers thus did not have to capture the agency,
they simply had to keep Congress from acting. Agency inaction was enough.
The Treasury Department, when presented with Congress's 1913 income tax,
did not start with a blank slate. The United States had two previous national
experiences to draw on, both incorporating the individual as the tax unit.36 On the
other hand, progressive policymakers often used the British income tax as a model,
and its regime treated married couples as the tax unit.37 Then-Congressman Cordell
Hull (D-TN), who wrote the first (that was really the last) draft of the income tax
statute, contemplated following the British lead and requiring spouses to file jointly,
but he believed that married women's property acts would make such a law
unconstitutional. The larger congressional body did not debate the issue; marital
1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 960 (1986); Matthew D. MCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989); Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHi-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997). But see
Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG.
81 (1985).
33. Macey, supra note 5, at 951; Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. i137 (2001).
34. See Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Tax Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53,
53 (2008).
35. The process was political. "[The regulatory process] involves negotiation and compromise as well as
evolving strategies to achieve certain ends." Dwyer, supra note 11, at 315.
36. See generally Act of August 5, 1861, 12 Stat. 292 (1861); Tariff of 1894, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). Civil
War politicians were aware of this potential tax avoidance. See Henry Wilson (R-MA), CONG. GLOBE, 38TH
Cong., IST SESS., 2515-16 (daily ed. May 28, 1864) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson).
37. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 77-1040, at 64-68 (1941); Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., vol. 2, at 1254-55 (1942) (statement of William
Greenough, Attorney at Law); 87 CONG. REC. 6480, 6600, 6715 (1941); 88 CONG. REC. 6332 (1942).
38. See CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HULL 70-71 (Macmillan 1948); ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK SUPPLEMENT 1941-1942, at 1016 (1941). Hull likely meant to
have husbands file the family's return, as they did in Wisconsin, although this is not certain. If that was the
case, joint filing would require the husband to pay tax on income that not he but his wife owned.
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status only entered congressional debates regarding exemption levels and then
issues of gender equality mixed together with concerns about the progressivity of
the tax.39
The income tax section of the Tariff Act of 1913, only ten pages long, imposed
a new tax "upon the entire net income arising or accruing. . .to every citizen of the
United States."40 Throughout the statute "citizen," "individual," and "person" were
used interchangeably.41 Congress's answer to the tax unit question had simply been
to replicate its past language with little debate. This was consistent with Congress's
approach to many other issues of the practical administration of the tax.42 Devising
answers to questions of the tax's operation was politically dangerous because the
choices carried the risk of raising someone's taxes.43 The statute's speedy passage,
although minimizing opposition in Congress, merely postponed problems to its
implementation phase. 44
The postponement of congressional clarification continued until the 1948
adoption of the married couple as the tax unit. In each enacted statute, Congress
taxed the "net income of every individual." 45 Seemingly clear, this language could
have been interpreted in multiple ways: Income of a person could be defined based
on legal title to, benefit from, or control over income.46 Each of these tests could, in
turn, be based on a national standard or be interpreted as requiring deference to
state law. Because Congress had not specified what the indicia of ownership to be
taxed precisely were, first the Treasury Department and then the courts were
required to determine who was the appropriate owner of taxable property in a
myriad of legal and factual situations. 4 7
Thus, what at first glance might appear to be clear language in reality allowed
Congress to defer issues of the tax's application as the legislature failed to develop
a coherent method to determine what specific property was owned by a particular
39. See, e.g., TREASURY DEP'T, INCOME TAX: EXTRACT, S. DOc. No. 63-4 1 (1913); 50 CONG. REC.
1,254-57, 3,850-52 (1913). The Senate's Finance Committee tried to permit each spouse to take a full
individual exemption, but it agreed to a lower marital exemption but one that more than covered the $587
mean adult male income. 50 CONG. REC. 3,771, 3850-51 (1913); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS, Series D 722-727, at 164.
40. See Tariff Act of 1913, sec. 2, 38 Stat. 114, at 166 (1913).
41. See generally id. The surtax was levied on "every individual" and "every person" subject to the tax
had to file a retum.
42. See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahon, A Law with a Life ofIts Own, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 1 (2009).
43. See W. ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 54 n.6 (2004).
44. For a similar experience, see Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 539 (2008).
45. See, e.g., Act of 1913, supra note 40; Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756 (1916); Revenue Act of
1917, 39 Stat. 1000 (1917); Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919); Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227
(1921); Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (1924); Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 9 (1926); Revenue Act of
1932, 47 Stat. 169 (1932); Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680 (1934); Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 447
(1938); Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798 (1942).
46. These possibilities became more important as the meaning of property changed in the Progressive
Era. See infra note I 10.
47. The Sixteenth Amendment and the income tax statutes also did not define "income" or "taxpayer."
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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individual, especially within the close relationship of the family.48 This ambiguity
in the statute soon became a loophole for wealthy married couples; but while some
wealthy couples would soon benefit significantly from this inadvertently made
policy, few couples actually did so. An average of only 2% of the labor force paid
federal income tax each year from 1913 to 1915.49 Because few families had
income above family exemption levels, the loophole went unused by most
Americans.
After the tax's enactment, the Treasury Department was given only twenty-
eight days to prepare regulations governing the tax's practical operation before
withholding was to begin on November 1, 1913.50 This necessity forced the
Treasury Department to recognize some system for applying the tax to families.
The choice to be made was whether to take the statute at its word and devise rules
for dividing family income or to apply the statute to couples as a single unit.
Despite the wording of the statute, the Department first took the position that the
1913 income tax treated the couple as a unit.51 "The husband, as the head and legal
representative of the household and general custodian of its income, should make
and render the return of the aggregate income of himself and wife." 52 The Treasury
Department understood that such a treatment would impose a relatively higher tax
burden on some marriages, those of wealthy couples. 53
This early structure of relative burdens was short-lived. The next year the
Treasury Department reversed course, ruling that husbands and wives must file
separately if they had separate income. 54 This change benefited wealthy couples
because it allowed them to reduce their collective taxes if they shifted income
between spouses because more income would be taxed in lower tax brackets.
Spouses gave each other gifts and established joint tenancies, trusts, and family
partnerships in order to shift income.55 Other couples relied on their state
48. See Tariff Act of 1913, supra note 40, at 166. Some members of Congress complained that the
delegation created a "third House of Congress by depositing in departmental officers discretion as to whether
or no[t] laws shall actually have vital operation or not." See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d. Sess. 631
(1870) (statement of Sen. Thomas Bayard). See also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 315, 1531 (1861).
49. W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on US. Tar Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 29, 41-42 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000); WITTE,
supra note 7, at 79.
50. TREASURY DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, H.R. Doc. NO. 358, at 5
(1913).
51. The Treasury Department might have relied on the language regarding exemptions that allowed "only
one deduction of $1,000 shall be made from the aggregate income of both husband and wife when living
together." See Tariff Act of 1913, supra note 40, at 168.
52. T.D. 1923, 15 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 298, 298 (1913).
53. See id
54. See T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 268 (1914); T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 48, 49
(1915).
55. See C. W. Leaphart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition of Federal Income and Estate
Taxes, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 587, 588 (1929); ROSWELL MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 274-76 (3rd ed. 1939). See
generally Bennett L. Smith, Common and Joint Tenancies, Partnerships and Federal Taxes, 9 TEX. B. J. 387
(1946). Assignments of future earnings, however, raised significant issues for tax purposes. See, e.g., Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Although from the tax's inception in 1913 a sale between spouses would trigger
the taxation of gain on the property, originally there were no tax consequences to giving the property as a gift
to a spouse, or to anyone else for that matter, because there was no transfer tax on gifts. See S.M. 3763, 3-2
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community property laws and then argued that these marital laws mandated that
each spouse report one-half of the family's income.56 The government's objectives
in making this change that led to the adoption of these devices are unclear. The
Treasury Department later admitted that its policy governing the taxation of
families in this early period "did not seem to derive from any clear conception. . .; it
seemed merely to be more convenient in some instances to assess it in this
manner."5 7
Despite the lack of a clear sense of the right way to tax couples, the Treasury
Department quickly demonstrated that it was not under the control of wealthy
couples by denying taxpayers favorable results where they shifted income unless
substantive changes were made to property ownership.5 8 The Department would
not uncritically accept all such arrangements but sought to determine whether the
lower-income spouse truly owned, under state property laws, the property
generating the income being reported. 59 The government evaluated these various
devices on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the recipient spouse was
actually given recognizable property rights and, therefore, entitled to report the
income. 60 Thus the Treasury Department took Congress's language seriously and
worked to make the regime function in an equitable manner.
Because the Treasury Department reviewed the rights created by couples'
devices under state law, not all devices were given the same beneficial treatment of
reducing a couple's taxes. If under state law wives' rights to property were
significantly limited, the federal government did not recognize income as shifted for
tax purposes.61 This invocation of federalism in the application of the federal
income tax gave states the opportunity to influence the amount of federal tax
receipts. It also ensured that couples would seek recognition of their individual
devices and a regulatory environment in which these devices could flourish. As a
result, those couples that had found means to reduce their taxes, and yet maintain
the appearance of high progressive tax rates, had every incentive to capture the
Department.
Nevertheless, as it sought to craft a nationally applicable federal income tax
C.B. 53 (1924).
56. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington had community
property regimes. For descriptions of community property from the period, see WILLIAM QUINBY DE FUNIAK,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 37-53, 70 (1943); GEORGE McKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1925); CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 178, 207-08 (1935);
Alvin E. Evans, Ownership of Community Property, 35 HARV. L. REv. 47 (1921); J. Emmett Sebree, Outlines
of Community Property, 6 N.Y.U. L. REv. 32 (1928).
57. "Tax Revision 1937: Project No. 3," 19 November 1936, Staff Memo, pp. 4-5, Box 54, Records of
the Office of Tax Policy/Division of Tax Research, General Records of the Department of the Treasury,
Record Group 56, National Archives, College Park, MD (hereinafter Office of Tax Policy).
58. See, e.g., Champlin v. Comm'r, 71 F.2d 23 (10th Cir., 1934); Northampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande,
138 Pa. Super. 235 (1939); Oakley v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A. 1082 (1931); Wilson v. Comm'r, 11 B.T.A. 963
(1928).
59. See, e.g., A.R.R. 636,5 C.B. 257 (1921); I.T. 1151, I-1 C.B. 1 (1922); I.T. 1186, 1-1 C.B. 3 (1922);
I.T. 2022, 111-1 C.B. 9 (1924).
60. See, e.g., I.T. 1574, 11-1 C.B. 143 (1923).
61. See, e.g., T.D. 2529, 19 C.B. 164 (1917); A.R.R. 636, 5 C.B. 257 (1921); I.T. 1186, 1-1 C.B. 3
(1922); I.T. 1574, II-1 C.B. 143 (1923); I.T. 1670, 11-1 C.B. 146 (1923).
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within the constraints of the statute, the Treasury Department troubleshot problems
of tax avoidance as it lobbied Congress to legislate a change to alleviate this
burden.62 The Department was acting within narrow constraints because Congress
had not expressly delegated to it the authority to define national rules of ownership
for federal tax purposes. As a result, the Treasury Department was forced to devote
substantial time and resources to disputes with taxpayers who devised plans to
avoid the federal income tax. 63 In order to create a national tax, the executive
agency had to act as though legislation were in place that had not even been debated
in Congress.
But as the Treasury Department recognized faults in the statute, Congress was
adding new complications to the tax unit issue.64 Under President Woodrow
Wilson, the federal government actively sought to promote social justice and, in
1916, Congress extended the marital exemption to the undefined category of "head
of family" in order to reduce the tax burdens of widows and widowers with
children.65 When challenged to define the term "head of family," one Senator
retorted, "it seems to me that the Treasury Department or the internal-revenue
collectors and the attorneys there could very well place the proper interpretation of
the term 'head of family.' It is a term of common acceptance."66 Those seeking this
revision delegated the task of making the statute operational to the executive
agency. Unsurprisingly, the public had questions regarding this term's meaning.
Only over time, and under the guidance of the Treasury Department, was the
definition of the head of family worked out. 68
This exemption, along with other changes following World War I, reduced the
number of taxpayers subject to the federal income tax from a wartime high.69 With
the return to normalcy, neither the Republican government nor most taxpayers had
a stomach for a pervasive income tax. At this early date, a little over 5% of the
population filed an income tax return, the vast majority of whom were married and
with a dominant income earner.70 As a result, this early system favored the largest
group of taxpayers, although the cost of the favor was the shifting of income
between spouses.
In the face of taxpayer activity, the Treasury Department changed course
62. See infra Part III.
63. It was estimated to cost $1.56 per return for which a tax was paid and $.50 if a tax was not paid. Roy
Blough, Problems of Federal Tax Administration, 214 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 157, 159 (Thorstein Sellin ed., 1941).
64. Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Claude Kitchen (D-NC), proposed a bill that would
have clarified the family unit (including children) for the normal tax, but it failed. See H.R. 16763, 64th
Cong., 53 CONG. REC. 10,664 (1916).
65. See Revenue Act, 1916, sec. 7, 39 Stat. 756, 761 (1916). See also 53 CONG. REC. 13,268-75 (1916);
T.D. 2427, 18 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 278 (1916); T.D. 2692, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 291 (1918).
66. 53 CONG. REC. 13,274 (1916) (statement of Sen. James Wadsworth (R-NY)).
67. See, e.g., Who is Head of Family Defined, CHIC. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 20, 1920; Income Tax Act of
1920, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1920.
68. See, e.g., I.T. 1618, 11-1 C.B. 123-24 (1923); I.T. 1619, 11-1 C.B. 124 (1923); TREASURY DEP'T,
REGULATIONS 45, H. DOC. NO. 1826, at 75 (1919).
69. See STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK, & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 81 (2008).
70. See id at 79.
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several times with respect to specific devices. 1 For example, in 1918 and 1919 the
Secretary of the Treasury required the filing of a joint return by community
property couples.72 Two years later, in response to public pressure from taxpayers
in these states and from their representatives, the Department asked the Attorney
General to determine the appropriate way to tax community property couples. 73 The
Attorney General succumbed to community property states' pressure in 1920,
allowing spouses to divide all their community income and made community
property the most effective family tax reduction device. 74 The Treasury Department
followed suit.75 In this case, it does appear that the government was captured by
wealthy couples in eight states.
However, the early Treasury Department policies were not built on an abstract
notion of the "best" tax unit as much as a need to make the system operational and,
to that end, they often floundered for the best method to tax married couples. In its
Income Tax Primer published in 1918, the Department established a policy of
convenience rather than establishing some underlying basis in equity. 76 It required
couples file joint returns if their combined incomes, with that of their dependent
children, equaled or exceeded $2,000. However, if, and only if, a husband and wife
each received an independent income of $1,000 or more, they could file
separately. 77 In regulations published the next year, the Department permitted "a
husband and wife living together [to file] a single joint return," however the means
the couple used to file did not necessarily correspond to how they would be taxed. 78
This debate, as long as it presumed that couples had the option of separate
filing, did not resolve the Treasury Department's problem of couples who shifted
income to avoid taxes and then filed separately. In an attempt to limit this type of
tax avoidance, the executive branch focused its congressional challenge on the tax
advantage perceived to be enjoyed by couples of the community property states.
Andrew Mellon's Treasury Department led a charge, more rhetorical than effective,
against the community property advantage in 1921 and again in 1924.79 Many in
71. See, e.g., 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 298 (1920); also published as T.D. 3071, 3 C.B. 221 (1920); Sol. Op. 90,
4 C.B. 236 (1921); O.D. 960, 4 C.B. 255 (1921); I.T. 1997, 111-1 C.B. 149 (1924).
72. See O.D. 285, 1 C.B. 189 (1919).
73. See 61 CONG. REC. 6,917 (1921) (statement of Sen. Robert Broussard); 61 CONG. REC. 6,973-4
(1921) (letter of Jesse Andrews to William E. Borah, 14 September 1921).
74. See Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 71; (1920): O.D. No. 426, 2 C.B. 198 (1920); William T. Hancock, A
Look at Community Property Law, 34 VA. L. REV. 417, 419 (1948). This beneficial treatment did not apply to
California. See generally Stephanie Hunter McMahon, California Women, 25 Wisc. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 35
(2010).
75. See TREASURY DEP'T, REGULATIONS 62, art. 31, at 32 (1921); T.D. 3568, 111-1 C.B. 84 (1924)
(including California).
76. See generally TREASURY DEP'T, U.S. INT. REV., INCOME TAX PRIMER, H.R. Doc. No. 841 (1918).
77. Thus, if one spouse earned $999 and the other either $1,001 or $I million, the spouses could file
separately. Likewise continuing the Department's earlier policy, if the couple combined earned more than
$2,000 the normal tax would be assessed against the aggregate amount of their incomes regardless of how
they filed, and the surtax would be assessed only against the separate income of each. See id.
78. See H.R. Doc. No. 1826, at 98 (1919) (also presuming joint return of family income by husbands
unless families took affirmative steps to file separately).
79. 65 CONG. REC. 1,144 (1924); 61 CONG. REC. 6,595 (1921). See also Covey T. Oliver, Community
Property and the Taxation ofFamily Income, 20 TEX. L. REv. 545 (1942).
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the executive branch were unhappy when Congress refused to take action, believing
these early community property laws were simply another taxpayer device.so This
Mellon attack also indicated a continued commitment to the case-by-case approach,
looking at particular devices and the state law upon which they were based, rather
than confronting the larger issue of whether the couple, as opposed to the
individual, should be the basis for income taxation.
By making these case-by-case determinations, the Treasury Department did
more to narrow this loophole in the period before 1948 than Congress, not because
the Department desired to take the lead, but because doing so was necessary for the
operation of the tax. This meant, however, that the application of the income tax to
the family was developed on an ad hoc basis. The Attorney General wanted the
confusion about the appropriate tax treatment of families' income to be resolved on
a state-by-state basis and by state courts, and not on a national basis by the IRS or
congressional action.8 1 On the other hand, showing divisions in the executive
branch, the Treasury Department prepared, but withheld as a result of political
pressure, an administrative ruling that would have overruled the application of state
property laws as well as the Attorney General's state law-based approach.82
Throughout the Great Depression, the executive branch recognized that these
forms of tax avoidance pervaded the system and eliminating them increasingly
became an administrative objective. While the Roosevelt administration targeted
many other avenues of tax avoidance, either for political reasons or to maximize
federal revenue to pay for its New Deal relief programs, attacking income shifting
did not serve either of these objectives particularly well.83 Much of the public was
barely aware of this particular tax abuse and the revenue loss was not substantial
from a national perspective.84 Instead, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his
Treasury Department targeted income shifting because he found it morally
80. 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 395 (1924), also published as T.D. 3670, 4-1 C.B. 19 (1925); 35 Op. Att'y Gen.
265 (1926) (income tax); 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 89 (1926) (estate tax), also published as T.D. 3891, 5-2 C.B. 323
(1926); George Donworth, Federal Taxation of Community Incomes - The Recent History of Pending
Questions, 4 WASH. L. REV. 145, 161 (1929).
81. The Attorney General never interpreted Robbins as asserting any power or intent on the part of
Congress to tax community property husbands on couples' joint income. T.D. 3891, supra note 80, at 237-38.
82. Letter from Tarleau to Sullivan, Legislative History of the Treasury's Position With Respect to
Compulsory Joint Returns and Community-Property Income, June 10, 1941, OTA/DTR Files, Box 54,
available at http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/marriage/hst28693/28693-1.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2012). All administrative rulings on the issue of community property were withdrawn so that the
Treasury Department could bring additional test cases; cases litigated in 1930.
83. For Roosevelt's views on tax avoidance generally, see A Message to Congress on Tax Revision, Jun.
19, 1935; Two-Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Press Conference (Excerpts), Jul. 31, 1935; A Supplemental Budget
Message to the Congress, Mar. 3, 1936; In 1776 the Fight Was for Democracy in Taxation. In 1936 That is
Still the Fight, Oct. 21, 1936; The President Urges Legislation to Prevent Tax Evasion, Jun. 1, 1937, all in
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (1938-); Press
Conference No. 370, 28 May 1937, COMPLETE PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 9:396-405 (1972); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 119-20 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003); 1 JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES
323-37 (1959). But see ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 325-27 (1960); DAVID M. KENNEDY,
FREEDOM FROM FEAR 275-76 (1999); MARK LEFF, LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM 91-96 (1984).
84. See pp. 156-7, 170, 172 for projected revenue amounts.
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offensive. 5 It troubled him that wealthy couples and their lawyers and accountants
used these devices to avoid their financial responsibilities to the federal
government, particularly at a time of national emergency.
However, Roosevelt's Treasury Department had little luck changing the tax
unit. In mid-1933, the Department was at a low-point in its influence on tax
policy.86 Nevertheless, as Secretary of the Treasury Department, Roosevelt's close
friend, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., asked Congress to consider taxing husband and wife
as a single unit. Morgenthau argued that such a provision would put all married
taxpayers on equal footing by eliminating these income-shifting means of tax
avoidance. In his view, continuing to permit separate tax returns threatened to
"defeat the progressive rate schedule, particularly in the case of the larger
taxpayers." Morgenthau's moralistic attacks focused on comparisons between
taxpaying groups, but its results would have increased tax burdens on many wealthy
married couples across the nation. In December, Treasury Department officials
were disappointed that Congress rejected their solution.89 Morgenthau tried a
similar approach in 1937 and, again, failed. 90
Because of its relatively limited power, the Treasury Department used debate
and investigation as a substitute for policymaking in the 1930s. The Department
undertook two comprehensive examinations of the federal income tax system and
included the issue of the tax unit each time. 91 When these reviews failed to produce
a viable solution to the income-shifting problem, the Treasury Department
abandoned the position it had claimed since 1913. In new regulations, the
Department required husbands and wives to be taxed separately.92 After failing to
85. See infra note 88.
86. BLUM, supra note 83, at 1:297-98; Mr. Roosevelt's Men, FORTUNE, Apr. 1934.
87. Tarleau to Sullivan, supra note 82; Treasury Department, Statement of Acting Secretary of Treasury
Regarding the Preliminary Report of the Committee on Ways and Means Relative to Methods of Preventing
the Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue LawsFalse, 73d Cong. 15 (Comm. Print 1933).
88. Hearing on Revenue Revision, 1934 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong. 113
(1933).
89. H.R REP. No. 73-704, at 2, 44 (1934); Tarleau to Sullivan, supra note 82. Hearing on H.R. 8396,
Community Property Income, Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 77d Cong. 6 (1934) (statement of Allen
T. Treadway (R-MA)). Lovell H. Parker, the first chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation, suggested a management and control proposal in a memorandum dated September 26, 1933, to the
Ways and Means Committee. Reprinted as L.H. Parker to E. Barrett Prettyman in Hearings on HR. 8396, 16-
22. This proposal was rejected in the House, but by a bare majority vote, due largely to opposition from
community property representatives. Tarleau to Sullivan, supra note 82. There was no discussion of the issue
in the Senate. Revenue Act of 1934: Hearing on HR. 7385 Before S. Comm. on Finance, 73d Cong. (1934); S.
REP. NO. 73-558 (1934).
90. Hearing on Tax Evasion andAvoidance Before Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th
Cong. 309 (1937); Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Evasion and Avoidance, H.R. Doc. No. 337, at 7
(1937). See Randolph Paul, The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. CI. L. REv. 41, 84-85 (1937).
91. See Carl Shoup, Forward and Summary of Recommendations, The Federal Income Tax System, A
Report to the Secretary of the Treasury, 20 September 1934, Box 62, Office of Tax Policy, available at
http://taxhistory.tax.org/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23735/23735-1.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2012));
Blakey, Federal Income Tax, Section VII: Joint versus Separate Returns, in Roy G. Blakey, The Federal
Income Tax System, 20 September 1934, Box 62, Office of Tax Policy, available at
http://www.taxhistory.org/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23737/23737-5.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2012)); Hearings on Revenue Revision, supra note 88 atl 12-6; MAGILL, supra note 55, at 392-99.
92. Treasury Department, Regulations 86 Under the Revenue Act of 1934, art. 51-1, 117-5 (1935): 129,
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win support from Congress, as far as the executive branch was concerned married
couples were no longer a taxable unit even if they elected to file jointly.
That remained the executive's position until new revenue pressures were
applied during World War II, but even then it deferred action to Congress.
Economic need forced (or perhaps permitted) Morgenthau to renew in 1941 and
again in 1942 his proposal of taxing the marital unit.93 The Roosevelt
administration proposed this approach after it determined that taxing the family as a
unit would yield an additional $300 million in taxes from a small group of wealthy
taxpayers. 94 As a rhetorical matter, the Treasury Department justified this battered
proposal on the grounds that aggregating family income best reflected the family's
ability to pay, in its view the most fair basis of taxation. 9 Although the executive
branch stood firmly behind its proposal, with widespread public opposition to tax
increases, the proposal received a lukewarm reception in Congress.96 Thereafter,
until Congress took action in 1948, the Treasury Department continued to impose
separate taxation and abstained from further debate.
Thus, in the period before 1948, far from being captured by wealthy taxpayers,
the Treasury Department felt constrained by the governing statute to regulate tax
avoidance on a case-by-case basis, which it did. Moreover, it proposed specific rule
changes in 1921, 1924, 1933, 1934, 1937, 1941, and 1942, that would have created
a national solution for tax governance. Each time it failed. If we take the
Department at its word, it was attempting to stop the exploitation of a loophole by a
narrow segment of society. On the other hand, this approach permitted the
executive branch to attack avoidance rhetorically while the issue was also being
debated by the legislature and the judiciary, and so the Treasury Department was
liberated from responsibility. Once it was clear that the other branches were not
going to accept responsibility and dictate a response, the Treasury Department gave
up its calls for reform; it eventually forfeited its policies in the face of continued
congressional apathy.
218. See also G.C.M. 15438, 14-2 C.B. 156-8 (1935).
93. H.R. REP. No. 77-1203, at 10 (1941) (Conf. Rep.); Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942, supra
note 36, at 9 (statement of Henry Morgenthau); Hearing on H.R. 7378 Before S. Comm. on Finance, 77th
Cong. 2-7 (1942); 88 CONG. REc. 6,319-20 (1942).
94. Robert H. Montgomery, founder of Lybrand, Rose & Bros and Montgomery, later to become
PricewaterhouseCoopers, feared that a mandatory joint return provision would be declared unconstitutional,
necessitating refunds. MONTGOMERY, supra note 38, at 1016. Administrative convenience also made the
proposal attractive: It required numerous resources for administrators to determine which of the devices were
"real." See Blough, supra note 63, at 159.
95. Blough to Sullivan, "Compulsory Joint Returns," 10 June 1941, p. 1, Box 54, Office of Tax Policy.
The administration offset employment disincentives for wives with an earned income credit for couples with
two earners that would have sheltered from tax most wives' income. Hearing on H.R. 5417 Before S. Comm.
on Finance, 77th Cong. 7-8 (1941). Mandatory joint returns would raise $297 million in taxes, but the credit
would cost $39 million. Id at 8-9.
96. See 87 CONG. REC. 3,446-7, A3,546, 6,478-81, 6,617-18 (1941); 88 CONG. REC. A2,473, 6,319-25
(1942).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES: SETTING THE FRAMEWORK
In the early decades of the income tax, the federal judiciary struggled along
with the Treasury Department from the lack of congressional guidance: The courts
were left deciding the cases of income shifting brought by the I.R.S. 97 Although
scholars often question the motives of the Justices, in the case of this loophole, the
Supreme Court sought to read into the income tax rules that did not require
delegation, either to the states or the executive branch, to eliminate this means of
avoidance.98 As discussed below, the Court supplemented statutes in a manner
consistent with what the Court presumed was the legislative intent in order to
fashion a nationally-applicable federal income tax. In doing so the Court often acted
contrary to wealthy couples' interests. However, the Justices were unable to stray
far or for long from Congress's dictates, even when those dictates were expressed
through inaction.9 9 With new appointments to the bench, the Court stopped
inferring congressional intent and deferred future decisions to Congress.
Many of the cases involving income shifting came to the Supreme Court in the
late 1920s and early 1930s, but the litigation began in the early and mid-1920s, an
era when much of the nation experienced a backlash against the progressivism of
tum-of-the-century reformers. 100 Republicans regained control of Washington and
slashed marginal tax rates. This removed taxpayers from the rolls, so that by
1929 only 2.5 million taxable returns were filed.102 Nonetheless, the tax raised over
$1 billion in revenue, or over one-quarter of the federal government's total
97. For a survey of modern literature on judicial behavior, see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial
Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 270-329 (2005). See also Selmi, supra note 44, at 525; Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007).
98. The Court took a similar approach in other areas of law. See U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517
(1911); J.W. Hampton, Jr. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Union Bridge Co. v. U.S., 204 U.S. 364 (1910).
Issues of delegation of power were often raised in the Court's first 150 years but the Court never struck a
statute on that basis until the New Deal. See Panama Refining v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936). For recent
studies of the Court's power, see Michael Abramowicz & Emerson Tiller, Citation to Legislative History, 38
J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2009); Joseph Smith, Presidents, Justices and Deference to Administrative Action, 23 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 346 (2007); Nancy Staudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation, 82 N.Y.U.L REV. 1340
(2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Tonja Jacobi, Positive
Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 219 (2006); Staudt Judging Statutes, supra note
30, at 1911; Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1100
(2001); Daniel Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325 (2001).
99. For similar conclusions regarding the Court, see MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS (2004); Barry Friedman & Anna Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123 (2003); John
A. Ferejohn & Larry Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2002);
Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 282-86 (1957). For an interpretation that
gives the Court more power in changing the public's views, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
(2009).
100. For a discussion of progressivism in the law, see GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 29-31 (1995); GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 90-91 (1977); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 145-67
(1992).
101. There is evidence the anti-tax post-war response was bi-partisan. See Lawrence Murray, Bureaucracy
and Bi-Partisanship in Taxation, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 200 (1978).
102. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1929, at 4 (1931); BUREAU OF CENSUS,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS, Y339-342, at 1105; Y358-373, at 1107.
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receipts. 03 Such an important source of government funds, drawn from such a
small number of individuals, was certain to generate controversies and, ultimately,
litigation. The Treasury Department jealously protected its source of revenue and
the small group that had to pay felt increasingly persecuted and dispossessed. Even
though these wealthy couples repeatedly sought support by the Court, the Court was
not captured by those interests.104
Already in the center of a storm over Prohibition enforcement, the Court found
a surprising unity on tax issues that continued into the early 1930s, despite being
divided on other New Deal policies. 0 5 Over the course of the two decades
following the income tax's enactment, the Supreme Court generally agreed that, as
the income tax was written, the determination of who owned what for federal
income tax purposes had to be determined by state law, but it closely examined the
rights created under state law. 106 In doing so, the Court favored its own
interpretation over the Treasury Department's in the face of congressional inaction.
This behavior with respect to the tax unit issue was consistent with the Court's
activism on other tax issues. Before 1960, the Justices generally prioritized their
own viewpoints when deciding tax cases. 107 They might have privileged their own
precedent in the early years of the tax because there were so few other sources of
the law.
The Court's examination of state-law rights was more difficult that it might
appear, enlarging the loophole wealthy couples exploited.1 0 8 Rapid changes in the
economy brought about by industrialization prompted changes in the conception of
property that complicated the determination of ownership for tax purposes. Realist
legal thinkers' conception of property changed from being a single thing over which
one person had both ownership and control to a more complex idea of a bundle of
rights.109 As ownership grew more and more finely divided, the difference between
title versus control versus beneficial enjoyment became more central to the question
of federal income taxation but more difficult to parse under local law. The simple
ownership tests crafted by earlier generations of state and federal courts proved less
103. Id.
104. For more on repeat litigation, see Marc Galanter, Why The "Haves" Come Out Ahead, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 95. 97-104 (1974); Frank Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 355
(1999); Merrill, supra note 32.
105. Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the America Administrative State, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2006).
106. See Edmund N. Cahn, Federal Taxation and Private Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1944); Edward
N. Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799 (1943). This trend was consistent with the Court's
use of the Tenth Amendment to restrict the federal government's power. ALTON LEE, A HISTORY OF
REGULATORY TAXATION 1-11 (1973).
107. Staudt, supra note 30, at 1911.
108. But see Dennis Ventry, Saving Seaborn, 86 IND. L.J. 1459 (2011).
109. See Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913). This view was not new but only gradually was there a broader awareness of the
complexities of property rights. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69-85 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 248-58
(1993). The state was no longer a neutral enforcer of contracts and property rights but a wielder of a collective




persuasive. Moreover, taxpayers generally relied on exceptions or peculiarities of
local law to support arguments for favorable tax treatment, while the Treasury
Department took the position that these peculiarities and exceptions were
meaningless for federal income tax purposes.110
Not only was state law hard to apply, but federalism had become a contentious
political issue both in national politics and for the Court. Progressives thought
localism was important for functional reasons, with states serving as laboratories of
reform and, therefore, capable of being overridden when reform required."'
Conservatives invested federalism with its own independent normative value.112
These pressures and biases percolated up to the Court. At the same time, the Court
faced a countervailing value of national uniformity in the application of federal
law.11 3 The Court tried to ensure that the progressive national income tax would, in
fact, be nationally applied.
To reconcile the objectives of federalism and uniformity, the Court frequently
ruled that the administration of federal tax statutes had to be governed by the
economic reality of state-created interests until Congress explicitly took
jurisdiction.114 Thus, even before Congress acted the Court would not blindly
follow states' rules but, instead, it tried to determine what rights were actually
created under state law. By considering state law with a critical eye and
disregarding what it felt were hollow distinctions, the Court set the stage for a
strong federal taxing power, one that could be made stronger if Congress (but not
the executive branch) took its challenge to more clearly define ownership for
federal tax purposes. Thus, although the judiciary created guidelines for the other
branches of government, it remained reluctant to define clear limits on the taxing
power.
When the Supreme Court first ruled on income shifting between spouses, it
took a tough stand on this tax avoidance and, in dicta, recognized Congress's power
to legislate a national standard of ownership. Its earliest case involved California's
community property law.11 5 In United States v. Robbins, the executive branch
argued that to grant California the special privilege of splitting couples' income
between spouses would permit "the most direct discrimination against husbands
and wives in some forty States of the Union.... 116 The Treasury Department
accepted income shifting in principle, just not pursuant to California's community
property law because the state's law did not grant wives sufficient indicia of
ownership.
110. In the process, local policies that did not conform to accepted tax theories tended to be engulfed by
tax concepts expanded to fit them. Cahn, supra note 106, at 802, 817.
111. Post, supra note 105, at 44.
112. Id.
113. See Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194 (1938).
114. See, e.g., Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924); Burk-Waggoner Oil Asso. v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110
(1925); Tyler v. U.S., 281 U.S. 497 (1930); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U.S. 106 (1940); Morgan v. Comm'r, 309 U.S. 79 (1940). But see, Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
115. U.S. v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
116. Brief for the United States at 87, U.S. v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926) (No. 493).
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., agreed with the government in a scanty,
four paragraph majority opinion. Relying on state judicial opinions, Holmes
concluded that a California wife had in community property a "mere expectancy
while living with her husband."" 7 The proto-realist Holmes went further, however,
arguing that, even assuming California wives' interests to be vested, Congress
could still tax husbands on the whole of the family's income:
Even if we are wrong as to the law of California and assume
that the wife had an interest in the community income that
Congress could tax if it so minded, it does not follow that
Congress could not tax the husband for the whole ... .he
who has all the power should bear the burden ... 
Unlike earlier Court precedent, Holmes's controversial final paragraph discounted
the authority to be given to state law.
This expansive view of income taxation was not the result of a love of taxation
by Justice Holmes. Holmes had sided with Republicans' call to cut taxes in the
1920s.119 Holmes once dismissively complained that "[i]f all the world saw that a
tax, however levied, ultimately means a diversion of part of that stream to
government employees with so much less for those outside, they would see that in
each case it was a question of the relative value of the government return. . . ."120
Nevertheless, especially when it came to wealthy couples' income shifting, Holmes
pushed for a national interpretation of ownership, increasing the taxes of many
couples. 121
After Robbins, serious doubts developed about the potential success of schemes
to exploit the individual as the tax unit, even if the devices were based on laws that
had legitimate state purposes and long traditions. The Treasury Department
challenged many such schemes, one of which, inter-spousal contracts, it took to the
highest court in Lucas v. Earl.122 To allow taxpayers to minimize their collective
117. Robbins, 269 U.S. at 326-27. Holmes disregarded state legislative intent and used only state judicial
opinion to determine property interests. Id. Justice George Sutherland was the sole dissenter.
118. Id. at 327. Some interpret this entire line of reasoning as predicated upon the provisions of California
law. See Donworth, supra note 80, at 158.
119. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 11, 1924), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS 136-37 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946). One can see in Holmes's letters an undeniable defense of
capitalism and a strong antipathy to the redistribution of wealth. DAVID H. BURTON, POLITICAL IDEAS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 86-89 (1992).
120. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 24, 1914), in HOLMES AND
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 19-20 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston
eds., 1996).
121. Holmes almost always sided with the government in tax cases. Patricia A. Cain, The Story ofEarl, in
TAX STORIES 275, 279 (Paul Caron ed., 2003).
122. 281 U.S. 111 (1930), rev'g 30 F.2d 898 (1929), rev'g 10 B.T.A. 723 (1928). Appeals Income Tax
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1930; Pooling Income Decision Given, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1930; Tax Brief
Filed by Government, WALL ST. J., Jun. 17, 1929; Review Granted in Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1929.




taxes by contract would authorize individuals - because of state action permitting
such contracts - to trump the will of Congress.123 In essence, the executive branch
was pleading for the same sort of realist interpretation of the law that Holmes had
made in Robbins. In another pithy, this time three-paragraph, opinion echoing the
tone of his Robbins decision, Holmes for a unanimous Court again strengthened the
federal government's position vis-i-vis taxpayers. Not questioning the validity of
the contract, much as he had not questioned the status of the wife's interest four
years earlier, Holmes read into the Revenue Act a limitation on taxpayers' ability to
minimize their federal taxes. 124
The Court continued its campaign of protecting the income tax in its rulings on
family trusts. In Corliss v. Bowers, Holmes continued his efforts in Robbins and
Earl to minimize the role of the Court in tax cases and to allow Congress to make
the determination of the appropriate incident of ownership for federal income tax
purposes.125 Decided a little over a month after Earl, the Court held that taxation
was "not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid."1 26
In this case, a unanimous Court continued to craft a national approach to income
taxation. 127 Holmes endorsed Congress's power to set the appropriate incident of
ownership to be taxed. Mere title or trust form would not be enough to thwart that
congressional purpose.
At the end of the trio of Holmes cases (Robbins, Earl, and Corliss), although
the federal government had won in each, Holmes had not established a hard and fast
rule of property ownership for federal income tax purposes. Instead, Holmes
deferred to Congress, with the caveat that the Court would infer congressional
intent from time to time when necessary to decide a case with particularly egregious
facts. This standard was untenable, however, because Congress proved unwilling to
clarify its rules to govern ambiguous situations, putting pressure on the Holmes
approach. The pressure erupted eight months after Earl was decided and seven
months after Corliss. Arising out of the uncertainty created by Robbins, four cases
invoking the community property statutes of Washington, Arizona, Texas, and
Louisiana were consolidated before the Court, each involving the right of state law
to govern property ownership for federal income tax purposes.128
The Treasury Department expected to prevail over the married couples in Poe
v. Seaborn based on its recent experiences before the Court on the grounds that
income should be taxed to "the person who controls and enjoys [income], rather
123. MCCAFFERY, supra note 122, at 16-17.
124. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114-15.
125. A similar decision was rendered by Judge Schoonmaker in the Western District of Pennsylvania.
Clapp v. Heiner, 34 F.2d 506 (W.D. Penn. 1929).
126. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
127. Holmes concluded, "We consider the case too clear to need help from the local law of New York."
Id.
128. Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282
U.S. 122 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
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than to the person who holds title to the property from which it is derived."
129
However, Seaborn was not decided by Holmes; it was Justice Owen Roberts's first
decision for the Court and it signaled a new, less activist Court in tax matters.130 In
Seaborn, Roberts concluded that when Congress levied a tax on the "net income of
every individual," the "of' denoted ownership under state law, however that was
defined. 131 Thus, married couples living in these community property states could
divide community income between spouses and gain the reduction in federal taxes
denied the Robbinses, Earls, and Corlisses. Instead of using Holmes's precedents
that read state law with an eye to giving Congress the power to determine taxation,
Roberts applied the concept of federalism more stringently and read the Court's
earlier holdings narrowly, as requiring the Court to be much more deferential to the
states. 132 In the process, state property rules regained a portion of their pre-
Holmesian dominance and the loophole in the federal income tax won judicial
sanction. 133
Holmes joined Roberts in this opinion that proved favorable to wealthy couples
even though he had authored each of the earlier decisions. Beyond the tradition of
allowing a Justice's first opinion to be unanimous, a more thoughtful explanation is
available, although Holmes never revealed the reasons for his change of mind."' it
is likely that in Robbins Holmes had been unaware of, or felt he could ignore, the
fact that Congress had twice failed to act when confronted by the Treasury
Department with the tax advantage community property couples enjoyed.135 Then,
in Seaborn, attorneys for the taxpayers made it a major part of their argument that
the Court could no longer assume an intent Congress had failed to express. 136In
effect, in Seaborn Holmes and the Court deferred to a congressional decision not to
129. Brief for Collector at 5-6, Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (No 15). The Treasury Department
made this charge as a theoretical matter and because of practical difficulties. Under Washington state law, for
example, a wife could not create debts for the community, so that a wife would be unable to pay the tax
assessed against her out of the very income taxable to her. Brief for Collector at 42, Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S.
101 (1930) (No. 15).
130. The joint motion for certiorari in Seabom was granted May 25, 1930, a week before Roberts joined
the Court. 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
131. Poe, 282 U.S. at 109.
132. Roberts interpreted Robbins as applying only to California; narrowly distinguished Earl as involving
assignments of property by contract as opposed to divisions of property based on state policy; and interpreted
Corliss as based on a power that Congress actually exercised. Poe, 282 U.S. at 116-17.
133. That married couples in different states would be treated differently withstood challenge under the
uniformity clause. Poe, 282 U.S. at 117-18. The Court held to this position even as it recognized that conflicts
would be created between the states. While the Court might have desired to induce Congress to change the
statute to be more explicit as to which incident of ownership it intended to tax, it is also possible that the
Justices were willing to accept community property income splitting because they expected that its use would
be limited to the original community property states. The Court held in Commissioner v. Harmon that "[t]he
legal community system of the States in question long antedated the Sixteenth Amendment and the first
Revenue Act adopted thereunder." Comm'r v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 46 (1944).
134. Erwin Griswold noted a rumor that Justices Hughes and Stone, and potentially one other Justice,
wished to dissent and so simply "took no part." Erwin Griswold, Owen J Roberts as a Judge, 104 U. PA. L.
REV. 332, 338 n.5 (1955). Hughes was also known for his dislike of dissents. Paul Freund, Charles Evan
Hughes as ChiefJustice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4, 37 (1967).
135. See supra note 79.
136. See Brief of H.G. Seaborn at 71-73, 145-56, Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101 (1930) (No. 15).
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change an earlier executive interpretation of its statute despite prior judicial
precedent.' 37
As cases involving state community property regimes won the support of the
newest Justice, common law measures to permit husbands and wives to shift family
income for federal income tax purposes continued to percolate through the
courts.138 These cases would find their way to the highest tribunal soon to be rent
with faction. Once Holmes retired, the Court began to experience greater division in
tax cases. 139 Illustrating that the Court is not a cohesive body, it split as some
Justices grew increasingly conservative regarding taxation, and thus tolerant of
loopholes, in the face of congressional inaction.
Scholars have since discovered that a concern with revenue impacts the Court's
willingness to decide tax cases, 140 but the Court's increasing resistance to inferring
congressional intent might have been more the result of a concern for the judicial
docket. Tax cases had become the largest single item on the Court's docket.141
Moreover, one digest of 295 income tax cases in 1946 revealed that one-third
involved questions of the family group, with at least forty percent of those clearly
involving tax avoidance devices. 142 One might expect the Court to react with
hostility to the increase in its docket.143 As the Treasury Department had before it,
the Court was left constructing rules to fill the vacuum left by the legislature and
this took time and resources. But, for all of its attempts to choose among various
alternative resolutions, the Court was unsuccessful at developing simple judicial
rules governing the ownership of taxable income and property within families, in
large part because it lacked the power to define the appropriate tax unit for the
federal income tax.
Regardless of the Court's underlying motivation, a growing division over the
appropriateness of creating rules to prevent tax avoidance made it difficult for that
branch to formulate effective guidance for the other federal branches. While
continuing to allow Congress to choose the incidents of ownership to be taxed, the
Court increasingly required an explicit expression of congressional intent to tax a
137. The Treasury Department then extended recognition of income splitting to the remaining community
property states. Mim. 3853, 10-1 C.B 139-40 (1931); U.S. v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 793-94 (1931).
138. Compare, e.g., Smith v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 894 (1944), and Johnston v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 799 (1944),
with Lowry v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 730 (1944), and Tower v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 396 (1944), rev'd 148 F.2d 388 (6th
Cir. 1945), rev'd 327 U.S. 280 (1946). The Board of Tax Appeals became the Tax Court in 1942.
139. Justice Sutherland, in a series of family trust cases decided in 1935, ruled for the taxpayers even
though their stated motives for establishing the trusts included "to avoid high surtaxes on ... income."
Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48
(1935). Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo dissented in those cases, arguing that
a formal arrangement used by the taxpayer should not prevent the Court from recognizing the purpose of the
revenue statute and effectuating the objectives of Congress. Helvering, 296 U.S. at 47 (Stone, J., dissenting).
140. Nancy Staudt, Agenda Setting In Supreme Court Tax Cases, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 889, 894 (2004).
141. Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term. 1934,
49 HARV. L. REv. 68, 88-89 tbl. IX (1935); Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court at October Term, 1930, 45 HARv. L. REV. 271, 297 (1931).
142. John Ervin, Federal Taxes and the Family, 20 S. CAL. L. REv. 243, 249 (1947).
143. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Forward, Law as
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26, 70 (1994).
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particular property interest or to plug a particular loophole, rather than assuming, as
Holmes had done, that Congress intended to maximize government revenues by
creating a tax system that applied uniformly across the nation. 144 Only if Congress
stated its intent with sufficient clarity would the Court dismiss refinements of
title.145 Thus, Congress was given broad powers to determine the incidents of
ownership it wished to tax but, after Seabom, it was Congress's duty to make the
law clear.
The Court would not, however, write itself completely out of the role Holmes
had created when it appeared that taxpayers were taking too much license with the
tax statutes. For example, in Helvering v. Clifford, the Court held that the
technicalities of the law of trusts could not be used to avoid the federal income tax
and, in Burnet v. Leininger, it tightly circumscribed valid family partnerships. 146
Not all of the Justices agreed that the Court should retain even this limited power of
determining and applying congressional intent. Justice Roberts dissented in these
cases on the grounds that "Courts ought not to stop loopholes in an act at the behest
of the Government, nor relieve from what they deem a harsh provision plainly
stated, at the behest of the taxpayer. Relief in either case should be sought in
another quarter.", 147 That quarter being Congress. Roberts's position gained
dominance in the late 1930s and 1940s, endangering Holmes's common law
approach to federal income taxation.148
Nonetheless, the Court's response to this tax avoidance behavior created
through tentative steps what was in effect a common law of taxation but one that
stopped short of answering the question of who was to be taxed on what income. 149
The Court's jurisprudence failed to define a clear test for determining ownership for
tax purposes or even a rule prescribing when Congress was required to defer to the
states for that determination. This created difficulties because, absent perfect
statutory language or a clear indication of congressional intent, the power and scope
of revenue laws remained subject to substantial judicial discretion. Furthermore,
this indecision, both as to the degree of deference to be given to states'
determination of property rights and as to the applicability of the various common
law theories of ownership, left the Court's decisions open to attack and taxpayers
uncertain as to the consequences of their tax-planning choices.
Thus in the early decades of the modem income tax's operation, the Supreme
Court left its mark on the law's course of development, even onto such a seemingly
small issue as the tax unit. In contrast to the Court's approach in many other fields
144. Bumet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 678 (1933); DuPont v. Comm'r, 289 U.S. 685 (1933); Reinecke v.
Smith, 289 U.S. 172 (1933).
145. Wells, 289 U.S. at 678.
146. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1932).
147. Chfford, 309 U.S. at 342.
148. See Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 746 & n.15 (1949) (noting that, unless Congress attaches
tax consequences to a defined status, no such consequences exist); Helvering v. Wood, 309 U.S. 344 (1940).
149. According to Chief Justice Hughes, Congress always had the power to prevent the loss of federal




of law, it quickly accepted congressional supremacy: that Congress intended to
maximize federal revenues by crafting a universally-applicable tax regime. When
Congress proved unwilling to ratify its intent to create such a regime, the Court
pulled back, but fell short of a complete re-evaluation of its early common law-
based support for the federal income tax. In its refereeing between taxpayers and
the Treasury Department, the Court exercised essentially political functions in
deciding whether to constrain Congress by state law or to develop a federal
common law to govern federal income taxation. 150
By 1948, the Court had handed down several decisions regarding family
income shifting that took the power to define ownership for federal income tax
purposes from the Treasury Department, which had exercised it reluctantly, and
tried to give it to an equally reluctant Congress. One can question the value of this
early policymaking by the Court.15  It initially acted because of perceived
ambiguities in the governing statute but then pulled back when there was a
demonstrated inability by the political branches to resolve the issue. The legislature
and executive branches were complicit in the Court's early usurpation of power
because they transferred responsibility to a branch not directly answerable to the
people. Only the relinquishing of the Court's power forced Congress to act.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL SUPREMACY: ONLY IF WE MUST
By enacting an income tax without evaluating and conclusively deciding upon
a tax unit, Congress initiated thirty-five years of debate between the branches of
government. Not making that decision allowed Congress to isolate itself from the
political repercussions of imposing relatively higher burdens on an identifiable
group.152 At the same time, it allowed a preferred group, wealthy married couples,
to enjoy the benefit of a loophole. Finally, Congress could demand new
contributions every time the loophole was challenged by another branch.153 Thus,
this policy delegation by omission provided Congress significant benefits.
This approach to delegation is not unusual but, nonetheless, most scholarship
on the delegation of legislative power focuses on overt delegation.154 The same
150. See Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV.
1243, 1244 (1999).
151. For example, Epstein finds problematic judicial independence when used to subvert the political
branches. Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice
Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 847 (1990).
152. No-win issues are particularly likely to be delegated because some important constituency will be
angered. Dwyer, supra note 11, at 245-46.
153. For other discussions of legislative rent-taking in tax policy, see Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S.
McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913
(1987); Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 891
(1997); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to
Professors Graetz andKaplow, 85 VA. L.REV. 1155, 1172-73, 1175 (1989).
154. Scholars question why Congress chooses to delegate decision-making and to which branch it is best
to delegate. Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of Delegation, 98 AM. POL. SC. REV. 293
(2004); Morris Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33 (1982); Margaret H.
Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title
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motivations that make Congress expressly delegate its power also applies when it
does so without taking action. For example, Congress might be unable to anticipate
all relevant issues,1s or to form a congressional consensus,156 or congresspeople
might desire to avoid blame for unpopular choices. 157 Although the motivations
might be the same, the consequences of delegation "seem most bleak when, in
delegating the legislature abdicates."15 8
When the tax unit was debated in Congress before 1948, congresspeople
protected wealthy constituents' interests by not closing the loophole. For example,
representatives from community property states worked to thwart Treasury
Department attempts to remove the community property advantage. 159 Whether
legislators were captured by interest groups in a sinister sense or represented
constituents more benignly, those in Congress often put the narrow interests of
wealthy couples ahead of the desire to create a nationally-applied income tax.
Defaulting to this position was relatively easy because it only required
congresspeople to refrain from acting. No one had to go on the record raising
anyone's taxes.
These political constraints were made stronger because wealthy constituents
benefiting from the loophole felt the retention of the tax benefit of income shifting
as more valuable than rate reductions, particularly as the reductions might come at
some undefined point in the future.160 This was not only an issue of timing but
psychologists have demonstrated that people treat foregone gains, here the gain of
rate reduction, as less important than losses, the loss of income shifting.161 Those
who stood to lose the tax benefit tried harder to prevent reform than those who
hoped to gain by an improved tax system. The benefit of being able to shift income
created a sense of entitlement, an endowment effect, that legislators could only
overcome when they were able to preserve the gain and thereby frame the issue as a
broader tax cut. 162
Revenue needs alone were not enough to overcome this resistance. As the
VII, 63 VAND. L. REv. 363 (2010); Mashaw, supra note 32, at 91-95; David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A
Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L. J. 97, 106-12 (2000) Stephenson, supra note 5.
155. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983).
156. Daniel Rodriguez, Statutory Language and Political Advantage, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 218-
19 (1992); Shepsle, supra note 31; David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL
L. REV. 397, 432 (2002).
157. Peter Aranson, supra note 32, at 56-62. Contra DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKNEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE 81 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1991) (arguing against the "pass the buck" rationale).
158. Arthur Lupia & Mathew McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 91, 96 (1994).
159. See supra note 74.
160. New Support for Tax Splitting, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jun. 27, 1947, at 45; Tax Bill Improved,
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 11, 1941, at 171; Taxes, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 15, 1947, at 26; Taxpayers Rise Up, Bus.
WEEK, Jan. 18, 1941, at 17-18; The Ingenious Taxpayer, FORTUNE, Feb. 1947, at 108.
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nation entered World War I, the concern for revenue forced Congress to recognize
the problem of the tax unit even though it would not take decisive action for two
more decades.163 Seeking to increase federal revenue, one Senator proposed an
amendment that, "for income-tax purposes. . .a husband and wife shall be regarded
as 'one person,' and their 'combined' income shall be reported on one income-tax
return, and that the []tax shall be collected on the combined income of both."l 64
Requiring mandatory joint filing and taxing the combined incomes of both spouses
at the same rates applied to single taxpayers would push more income into higher
tax brackets and raise more revenue. Unsurprisingly, this proposal raised the
objections of wealthy couples, and Congress sided with those interests.165 This
action (or inaction) was repeated when the Treasury Department attempted to target
the community property states' "marked advantage" in the 1920s.166
Similarly, the Supreme Court's decisions in the late 1920s and early 1930s
could have prompted Congress to resolve the question of the appropriate tax unit.
The Court had taken the power to set national standards for applying the income tax
from the executive branch and unambiguously given it to Congress.167 Congress,
however, proved reluctant to act upon the Court's mandate. Part of Congress's
reluctance came from a predictable source: Any policy dictating who would be
taxed on income within the family would increase the taxes of at least some
wealthy, powerful constituents (whether married or single). Any choice was certain
to anger someone. Therefore, though the Treasury Department and the Court asked
for resolution, Congress deferred taking a stance until it was forced to act.
When confronted with proposals from the Treasury Department in the 1930s,
Congress talked more than it acted. It took some amount of tax avoidance, which
included use of the income-shifting loophole, as a fact of life that it would not
seriously challenge.168 Economist Henry Simons denounced this, arguing, "One
senses here a grand scheme of deception, whereby enormous surtaxes are voted in
exchange for promises that they will not be made effective. Thus, politicians may
point with pride to the rates, while quietly reminding their wealthy constituents of
the loopholes." l69 This prevailing sense that tax avoidance was inevitable colored
163. Wilson proposed doubling tax rates in 1918 which allowed anti-tax opponents to regain control of
Congress. See Elliott Brownlee, Tax Regimes, National Crisis, and State-Building in America, in FUNDING
THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941-1995 at 37, 60-67 (Elliott Brownlee ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
164. 61 CONG. REC. 11,312 (1918) (statement of Atlee Pomerene (D-OH)).
165. 61 CONG. REC. 10,419-22, 11,312 (1918); Husband and Wife Returns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1918.
Congress's confirmation of the executive policy of allowing a choice of filing options garnered little public
attention. Tax Law Carries Ruling to Keep Peace in Family, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1919.
166. Hearing on Revenue Revision, 1924 Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 68th Cong., vol. 3, at
194-6; vol. 5 at 263-80, 319, 350-2; vol. 6 at 478-82 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 67-350, at 11 (1921); H.R. REP.
No. 67-486 (1921) (Conf. Rep.); see also S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 14 (1921); 61 CONG. REC. 5,917-21, 6,584-
95, 8,037-38 (1921).
167. See supra Part III.
168. See, e.g., Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, supra note 90, at 9-16; 78 CONG. REC.
2656-57 (1934); 67 CONG. REC. 3876 (1926); 65 CONG. REC. 916 (1924); Statement of Acting Secretary of
Treasury on Preliminary Report of a Subcommittee on Committee on Ways and Means 1 (Comm. Print 1933).
169. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF
FISCAL POLICY 219 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1938).
168 [Vol. 37:2
Political Hot Potato
congressional debates over the best tax unit.
This is not to suggest that Congress did not recognize the benefit of attacking
this tax avoidance in a strong, but purely rhetorical, way. In the early 1930s
Congress investigated perceived abuses by Wall Street, abuses many blamed for the
stock market crash of 1929.170 The larger purpose behind this investigation was to
build a case for the regulation of the finance industry and calling attention to tax
avoidance was an effective way of demonstrating bankers' immorality. Some of the
most outrageous tax avoidance behavior identified involved income shifting
between spouses to avoid tax.171
In the end, Congress's response was largely rhetorical. While narrow
provisions to target specific abuses were passed, the final legislation did not address
the larger issue of the tax unit.172 Moreover, when it acted, Congress often
benefited narrow groups of taxpayers. For example, in 1928, Congress enacted a
provision that permitted the Treasury Department not to seek back taxes if the
Supreme Court invalidated community property income splitting that had been
allowed by regulation but was then being challenged in Poe v. Seaborn.17 3 This
protected taxpayers from retroactive change even if the government won the test
cases. 174 Despite the fact Congress recognized that wealthy taxpayers were
avoiding taxes with methods that "almost no fair-minded man would defend,"
including inter-family sales, gifts, and revocable trusts, Congress also did not seek
prospective change because it worried that "such a controversial item might delay
the passage of the revenue bill."175 As a result, Congress made little attempt to stop
the use of these devices. Similarly, the community property question was debated in
separate hearings, but they too amounted to nothing.176
By not nationalizing a system of property ownership and waiting to make
ownership between spouses irrelevant for the federal income tax, the American
system empowered and incentivized states to game the tax to the benefit of narrow
170. For a good discussion of the Pecora Commission, see Joseph Thorndike, "The Price of Civilization,"
188-97 (unpublished dissertation, 2005); RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING
DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 355-60 (Atlantic Monthly Press 1990); FERDINAND PECORA,
WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN MONEY CHANGERS (A.M. Kelley 1939); JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982).
171. PECORA, supra note 170, at 196-97; SCHLESINGER, supra note 83, at 253.
172. Congress plugged one loophole that Pecora had identified by enacting a provision that disallowed
deductions for losses on sales of property between family members. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 24(a)(6),
48 Stat. 680 at 691.
173. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 277, § 1108, 48 Stat. 680.
174. As reported by counsel to H.G. Seaborn, assurances were given that prior years would not be
reopened if the cases were promptly begun and prosecuted with diligence. Mim. 3723, 8-1 C.B. 89-92 (1929);
Donworth, supra note 80, at 168-69.
175. Roy Blakey & Gladys Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1934,24 AM. ECON. REv. 450, 452 (1934).
176. Hearing on H.R. 8396, at 6 (statement of Allen T. Treadway (R-MA)). In the hot summer of 1934,
the House held ten forlorn days of hearings on community property income splitting. There were only five
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local interests. 177 Five states succumbed to pressure to change their marital property
regimes from common law to community property to give their residents certainty
that their division of family income between spouses would be effective for federal
income tax purposes. Five states changed regimes, including socially
conservative Oklahoma and Nebraska, who would not have otherwise changed
regimes; more states seriously considered doing so but waited for congressional
action in 1948.179
As states changed their marital property regime to insulate local constituents
from federal taxes, issues of state importance were able to influence federal revenue
collections. Likewise, federal tax law drove states to alter their own domestic
property regimes. The fear that states would take such an action troubled
congresspeople for reasons as far ranging as that this would empower wives to that
it would disrupt local property law. so As these fears became politically salient
during World War II, few recognized who would lose the most from closing the
loophole. Of the revenue raised by mandating the couple as the tax unit, only $65
million would have come from eliminating community property's favorable
treatment-$288 million would have been derived from eliminating common law
income-shifting.18 1
During World War II, the pressure to define the appropriate tax unit became
more pressing as the tax raised more revenue from larger numbers of taxpayers. The
federal income tax reached new heights, exceeding 90%, and became a mass tax,
applying to middle class taxpayers for the first time.182 For some couples, income
shifting could generate tax savings of over 40% and so retained a powerful group of
supporters. 183
At the same time that income shifting benefited more Americans, both the
government's economic understanding and the nation's economic realities changed,
forcing policymakers to rethink tax policies. The tax unit became part of larger
economic debates because changing tax rates was recognized as one tool Congress
177. See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Save States'Residents, 27 LAW & HIST. REV. 585 (2009).
178. Id. at 612, 619-21.
179. Id.
180. Carolyn Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 267, 294-96 (1988).
181. Memorandum from Miss Coyle, Joint Returns of Income of Husbands and Wives (Apr. 15, 1941),
available at http://www.taxhistory.org/Civilization/Documents/marriage/hst28695/28695-1.htm (last visited
Feb. 21, 2012). Thirty-five percent of the increase in number of returns would come from community property
states. Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Mandatory Joint Returns 11 (Comm. Print 1941).
182. See Carolyn C. Jones, Mass-based Income Taxation: Creating a Taxpaying Culture, 1940-1952, in
FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941-1995, at 104-47 (Elliot Brownlee ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1996). Although family tax-planning became more valuable in the face of higher wartime tax rates, fewer
families needed artificial income shifting as more wives entered the workforce, and at higher wages, and
could report those wages on separate returns. Nevertheless, the percentage of separate filing as a percentage of
total returns and of married returns fell from 1940 to 1945, even though the absolute number of separate
filings increased over threefold. In 1937, only 2.6% of the nation's population paid federal individual income
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could use to curb inflation or to spark economic growth.184 Each choice of a tax
unit increased or decreased the taxes owed by various groups within society. This
new activist approach to the economy coincided with a realist reaction to earlier
progressive reforms as many lawyers and legal scholars sought a pragmatic reform
of the law. In the field of taxation, this shift manifested itself in a desire to
reduce the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code and the potential for taxpayer
abuse. ss A simple Code was thought more likely to produce the economic results
that Congress sought, and eliminating income shifting would allow Congress to
simplify the Code.
Nevertheless, taking a position against the individual tax unit, especially after
the Roosevelt administration's failed proposal for mandatory joint taxation, proved
difficult for those in Congress because opponents to the perceived tax increase were
quick to mobilize. Even if most members of Congress had wanted to adopt the
administration's policy during the war, of which there is no evidence,
representatives of community property states threatened a filibuster of the revenue
bill to protect individual filing. 187  The Secretary of the Treasury Department
sacrificed mandatory joint filing, and an increased tax burden on wealthy married
couples, to get a revenue bill passed quickly.
Opponents of the World War II mandatory joint return proposals, mainly those
who benefited from income shifting and their representatives, succeeded in
portraying the issue as a social issue rather than a revenue one.189 Thus, they
painted the mandatory joint return as a threat to marriage and the family. Congress,
who in previous years had argued that allowing wives and mothers to enter the
workforce would destroy the family, now reversed course and argued that a tax
provision that gave wives an incentive to leave the workforce was a threat to
domestic peace. 190 Business leaders, who certainly had an economic motivation for
their views, warned that the proposal would decrease the rate of marriage by ten
184. For a good description of the evolution of fiscal policy following World War II, see Herbert Stein,
The Development of Consensus, 1945 to 1949, in THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 197-240 (AEI Press
1990); Hearing on Tax Changes for Shortrun Stabilization Before Joint Economic Comm. Subcomm. on
Fiscal Policy, 89th Cong. (1966).
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supra note 7, at 103-04.
187. Hearings on H.R. 5417, at 1571. Discussing the 1941 proposal, Walter George (D-GA) noted the fear
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filibuster." 93 CONG. REC. 5921 (1947); see also The Congress, TIME, Sept. 15, 1941.
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percent and increase the rate of divorce by as much as twenty percent.' 91 Whether
proponents of the measure believed it or not, the argument that joint returns would
hurt women's rights became the "iron petticoat" that the measure's opponents hid
behind.192 Bertrand Gearhart (R-CA) and other community property
congresspeople made women's rights the decisive issue in their efforts to protect
their constituents' tax advantage. 193
Women's groups also joined the debate and were divided along socio-economic
lines. The National Woman's Party, speaking largely for middle- and upper-class
women, despite recognizing that the Treasury Department's proposal would have
decreased most wives' portion of families' tax liability, opposed the plan. 194 On the
other hand, Eleanor Roosevelt on behalf of lower income groups "pooh-
pooed. . the idea that the proposal requiring married couples to file a joint income
tax return would undermine a working wife's independence.,,195 Some women's
groups actively supported the mandatory joint return proposal because they
perceived it more as class legislation than as gender-based legislation. 196
For most women's groups, and most of the nation, this loophole was not
significant enough to produce a policy entrepreneur willing to take on the issue. 197
More than 80% of the population, the vast majority of American voters, did not
benefit economically from income shifting, but they did not have the political will
to push through a provision that would reduce wealthy couples' tax benefits.198
When billions of dollars needed to be raised, as it was during World War II,
alienating sixteen Senators from community property states (fourteen of whom
were Democrats) to raise $300 million seemed unwise. 199 Moreover, while
Congress worked with the president in support of his foreign policy, the two
191. Letter from Leonard E. Read to Chambers of Commerce and Trade Associations, Memorandum (Jun.
28, 1941), Reel 71, National Woman's Party Papers, 1913-1974 (1981) (hereinafter NWP microfilm); see also
Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1942, at 276, 295.
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30, 1941, Reel 1, Women's Bureau, microfilm.
198. See WILLIAM GREEN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN TAXATION 51 (Commerce Clearing
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branches of the federal government feuded over domestic policy.200 Enacting, and
retaining, special privileges in revenue bills was one way for congresspeople to lash
out at the president with relatively little political cost. 201
America's relief at the end of World War II was tinged with worry about the
American economy.202 Although the nation would enjoy tremendous economic
growth in the decades following the war, neither the public nor policymakers could
predict this. With demobilization came the prospect of high unemployment,
declining wages, and labor unrest; while wartime labor shortages had accustomed
workers to job security and high wages. 203 Memories of the post-World War I
recession loomed large in the public memory. 204 Demands were made for cuts in
heavy wartime taxes to stimulate investment and encourage consumer demand,
even in the face of rising inflation and the heavy drain on federal finances imposed
by international obligations. 205
However, the separation of powers stymied tax policy development as a
Democratic President engaged in a two-year struggle with the Republican
Congress. Republicans condemned the then-current level of taxation as the
"crushing of initiative," "destroying... of free enterprise," and possibly resulting in
a "socialistic and communistic" system. 206 President Harry S. Truman, on the other
hand, saw the postwar revenue surplus as fleeting because of the government's
heightened international obligations and the increased social spending that would
accompany the nation's transition to a peace-time economy. With these concerns in
mind, Truman vetoed three tax-cutting revenue bills over the course of 1947 and
1948.207
As Congress and the president struggled over tax cuts, the issue of the
appropriate tax unit (either individuals or married couples) again became part of the
debate over federal revenue needs. Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee
Harold Knutson (R-MN) first proposed an across-the-board twenty percent tax cut
in 1947.208 Knutson's proposal was only marginally modified when it was
200. The Ways and Means Committee was particularly hostile to the Treasury Department in 1942. J.M.
BLUM, YEARS OF WAR, 1941-1945 at 39-42 (Houghton Miflin Co. 1967).
201. Id.
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resubmitted after a presidential veto.209 The goal of these two bills was to cut rates,
not to reform the income tax system. Truman's vetoes partially changed this. By
overriding the legislature, Truman prevented Congress from implementing a simple
plan for tax reduction, a plan that might have made substantive tax reform
impossible, or at least unlikely, as politicians who had already won the political
benefits of a tax cut would have had little appetite for discussing tax reforms that
themselves contained little popular appeal and with little revenue to fund them. 210
Forcing Congress to build a larger coalition to override the veto inadvertently
forced it to consider broader tax reform measures that ultimately led to the adoption
of nationalized income splitting.211 Although the tax savings that would be
generated by nationalized income splitting would accrue only to the upper-middle-
class and above, it enjoyed broad Democratic support in part because many hoped it
would reduce tax avoidance. Exploitation by the wealthy had long been a
significant concern of the Democratic party but not until 1948 was targeting tax
inequities, and in 1952 tax loopholes specifically, introduced into the party
platform. 212
After thirty-five years of self-inflicted gridlock over the tax unit, which had
worked to the advantage of taxpayers who had the desire and sophistication to
engage in tax planning, when Congress finally roused itself, its action cemented
those same taxpayers' gains.213 In doing so, the Revenue Act of 1948 eliminated
one opportunity for tax gamesmanship between states and effectively eliminated the
gains to be had from inter-spousal income-shifting devices. The Finance Committee
Chair admitted after the fact that it "was deliberately contrived in order to attract the
votes, because we wanted to reduce taxes. . . ."214 The Act did this by creating a
federal law that superseded state law for this tax purpose, but it did not extend the
community property regime to all states, as some claimed at the time.215 It did not
209. H.R. 3950 only changed the effective date of H.R. 1. In the face of the first veto, the Ways and
Means Committee began its scheduled comprehensive hearings on the revenue system. Revenue Revision,
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affect state-defined property rights in any way. By enacting nationalized income
splitting, Congress merely prevented state law-defined ownership as between
spouses from determining a couple's federal income tax liability.216
One of the more puzzling aspects of the enactment of nationalized income
splitting in 1948 was the relative silence of those arguably most affected: women.
Women's groups that had opposed mandatory joint returns in 1941 and 1942 kept
quiet in 1947 and 1948.217 With the only real pressure on this issue coming from
those seeking to protect tax reduction, Congress was not likely to take steps other
than to preserve the status quo. In this case, the legal actions of those avoiding taxes
did not energize a social movement. 218
This interpretation of nationalized income splitting as a political tool to
accomplish a broader goal of cutting taxes helps explain why Congress was able to
settle on a policy so quickly in 1948 after it had taken so long to act. Married
couples who were living in substantially similar circumstances but with different
incomes and appetites for tax planning had long experienced disparate tax
treatment. While a crisis might provide an opportunity for entrepreneurial
politicians and regulators to break the political logjams and pass rules that are
difficult to develop during ordinary politics, so too might crises provide
opportunities to pass on legislative favors.219 The framing of the issue as a tax cut
was crucial to Congress's ability to act.220 Policymakers understood that "[t]ax-
wise married citizens in the middle and upper brackets suddenly perceived the
application to tax reduction of Shakespeare's aphorism respecting the rose. Split
income would not only give them even more. . .but could also be respectably
defended as tax reform." 221
The political imperative of distributing a federal revenue surplus forced
Congress to act on this tax issue. Following wealthy couples' lead, Congress passed
Income Splitting Works, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 9, 1948.
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a targeted tax savings without clear debate on the underlying issues or a full
understanding of the potential costs that such tax savings might later entail.222 The
Revenue Act of 1948 used a significant portion of the post-war federal revenue
surplus, between $800 million and $1 billion, to accomplish that goal, even though
the savings reached only a limited number of families, roughly ten percent of all
married taxpayers. 223 This result meant that some wealthy taxpayers had leveraged
the Supreme Court's opinions handed down in the 1930s into significant, long-term
gains.
PART V. CONCLUSION
Whether married couples must file their federal tax returns jointly or as
individuals generated problems for the government and taxpayers alike, in part
because in 1913 Congress did not dictate a decisive rule. Instead, Congress
designed a broad policy objective for the income tax and let others fill in the blanks
as to the specific rules of its implementation. As a result, members of Congress did
not have to take responsibility for those individual decisions even when they
resulted in a loophole that allowed some taxpayers, but not all, to reduce their tax
obligations. While the consequences were inequitable, for most of the history of the
tax unit debate, Congress was content with this fragmentation of policymaking
power. Consequently, the 1948 change to the law resulted less from a well-thought
out governmental policy than from congressional reactions to the unintended
consequences of earlier policies. 224
Not only was Congress content with the fragmentation of power, but after a
period of attempting to resolve the issue of the appropriate tax unit, the other
branches of the federal government likewise conceded ground to the winning
interest group. Because closing the loophole of income shifting requires that one
branch decide which group(s) of taxpayers should bear a disproportionate burden of
taxation, policymakers proved reluctant to take decisive action and tried to shift
responsibility for these difficult, inevitably unpopular decisions to other branches or
levels of government.225 Neither the Treasury Department nor the Supreme Court
would indefinitely take the responsibility delegated by Congress. The federal
government's reluctance gave individual taxpayers and state policymakers the
opportunity to capture tax savings. Nevertheless, as the reach of the tax grew,
details of the tax's operation had to be re-evaluated and the Revenue Act of 1948
eliminated one source of inter-state and inter-couple disparities that had developed.
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The loophole was closed.
During the Korean War, individual income tax rates returned to 1945 levels,
and the high levels of taxation made clear who had benefited and who had not from
the postwar tax cuts.226 Although the 1948 rate reduction was wiped out, income
splitting remained, illustrating one policymaker and professor's argument that "a
tax decrease difficult to obtain in direct reduction terms may be secured more easily
through complex structural alterations." 227 Cuts that find their way into the
structure of the Internal Revenue Code are more likely to live on even when the
circumstances that beget them, here the norm of the one-earner household and a
federal budget surplus, no longer apply.
That the issue of the tax unit is a zero sum game, at least over time or when
viewed as some winning a reduction that others cannot enjoy, ensured that different
constituencies would lobby for advantage. The first salvo by single taxpayers was
made on behalf of a sympathetic group of singles, widows and widowers with
children, who complained of this relative tax advantage.228 In 1951, a partial
income-splitting bracket schedule was introduced for heads of households who
were defined as single taxpayers with dependents.229 However, that change alone
was not enough to resolve the zero sum game. In 1969, Congress acted to reduce
the benefits that married couples enjoyed relative to all single taxpayers but, in the
process, created a marriage penalty whereby two relatively equal earning spouses
will owe more tax after marriage than if they had remained single.230 More changes
have since been made as representatives seek to placate taxpayers who realize the
earlier policies disadvantage them.231 Thus the debate continues today as couples
complain about this marriage penalty but, since 1948, it is clear that the power
resides with Congress to redress constituents' concerns.232
The process through which congressional supremacy developed poses a threat
to democratic policymaking. The separation of powers, and the incentives these
structural forces create in the different branches of government, exert tremendous
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power outside of the political process on the law's course of development and direct
it in ways that are not necessarily consistent with any larger policy agenda. Policy is
often forged over time as a result of each of the different branches fulfilling its own
role in the face of exploitation of a loophole.233 An important question remains
whether this political reality is, nevertheless, the best possible result for these types
of political issues. This iterative process kept an otherwise unsalient issue under
consideration. When Congress did not step up, the other branches did - at least for a
time. Before the Treasury Department and the courts stopped making policy, they
had defined the issue. They would not, however, indefinitely accept this delegated
responsibility.
Regardless of its relative merits, for issues that are perceived by the public as
zero sum, political development is unlikely to be one of a single branch
affirmatively wielding the power to set the national agenda or of cooperation
between the branches or between interest groups and policymakers to do so. Rather,
it is a story of how all three branches of government abdicate their policy-making
power and, in doing so, create a vacuum that is only reluctantly filled. Without
policy leadership, some groups gain a significant first-mover advantage in that once
their preferred policy has been adopted, their representatives have little choice but
to defend that policy. The system thereby inadvertently strengthens the status quo
as the branches of government toss about the hot potato.
233. Peabody and Nugent, supra note 4, at 25-27.
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